











Manuscript version: Author’s Accepted Manuscript 
The version presented in WRAP is the author’s accepted manuscript and may differ from the 
published version or Version of Record. 
 
Persistent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/127571                               
 
How to cite: 
Please refer to published version for the most recent bibliographic citation information.  
If a published version is known of, the repository item page linked to above, will contain 
details on accessing it. 
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  
 
Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and 
practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before 
being made available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
Please refer to the repository item page, publisher’s statement section, for further 
information. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk. 
 
THE WITHDRAWAL OF UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND STATE CAPACITY: 
 DESCRIPTIVE TRENDS AND RESEARCH CHALLENGES 
 
Jessica Di Salvatore (University of Warwick)  
and Andrea Ruggeri (University of Oxford) 
 
While United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKOs) have moved away from 
traditional, security-focused mandates in the last generation of peacekeeping, most research on 
the effectiveness of peace missions continues to evaluate success based on security outcomes 
— such as levels of violence on the battlefield, civilian victimization, duration of ceasefires 
and violence containment.1 Few studies adopt broader and longer-term criteria for evaluation. 
Pioneers of this change, Doyle and Sambanis reframed the terms of peacekeeping from a focus 
on military strategies to a focus on peacebuilding.2 But while they showed that 
multidimensional missions can foster democratization and participatory peace in post-conflict 
societies, there is still debate among scholars and policy-makers about the use of peace 
missions as effective tools for state-building.3 Most of the discussion, especially among 
scholars, pays little attention to whether peacekeeping creates stable polities and institutions 
that endure when the international presence eventually leaves. In other words, if peace missions 
are beneficial for state capacity, is their legacy strong enough to avoid the possible pitfalls 
associated with PKO withdrawal? 
The primary challenge in answering these questions is identifying a suitable definition 
of state capacity. Maintaining order within recognized borders and a monopoly on the 
legitimate use violence is the core pillar of state capacity. Indeed, a definition based on security 
and military aspects is, as noted by Hendrix,4 consistent with Weber’s definition of what a 
modern state is. Governmental quality and administrative capacity is a second dimension that 
should be considered. Such quality can be assessed by examining the combination of 
democratic and authoritarian features of a government5 and, thus, it is often operationalized 
using the Polity index.6 This dimension, however, remains conceptually separate from the 
productive and extractive capacity of the state. Productive capacity relates to the economic 
performance of the state, such as its gross national product and export volumes. Extractive 
                                                          
1 Di Salvatore and Ruggeri, “The Effectiveness of Peacekeeping Operations”. 
2 Doyle and Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis”. 
3 Lake, “The Statebuilder’s Dilemma: On the Limits of Foreign Intervention”. 
4 Hendrix, “Measuring State Capacity”. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Marshal, Jaggers and Gurr, “Polity IV: Political Regime Characteristics and Transition, 1800-2008”. 
capacity captures the ability of the state to extract resources from the population — as measured 
by, for example, the share of GDP from tax revenues. The last pillar of state capacity captures 
external relations or the ‘diplomatic capacity’ of the central authority. The ability to establish 
relations with other states is an attribute of statehood, and— as a consequence—it remains an 
important, if underexplored, pillar of state-building programs. One challenge is that the impact 
of PKO withdrawal on a state’s foreign relations may be difficult to identify immediately after 
exit and yet, as argued by Diehl and Druckman7, long time frames can make it difficult to draw 
causal connections between interventions and outcomes (see also Caplan’s contribution to this 
forum). Overall, it is worth noting that different time frames may be more appropriate for 
evaluating the impact of missions’ withdrawals on each of the four dimensions of state 
capacity. 
Multidimensional missions that aim to increase the host state’s capacity need to operate 
across these four different dimensions to create conditions for durable, strong institutions. 
However, only a few studies have analysed the impact of peace missions across all the above-
mentioned state-building dimensions. Joshi,8 and Steinert and Grimm,9 focus on 
democratization processes and find that peacekeeping results in positive changes in the quality 
of governmental institutions, as measured by the Polity Score and the Freedom House index 
respectively. In terms of security, these same missions perform very well in creating less 
violent environments and preventing conflict relapse,10 although we know less about the 
success of security sector reforms.11 The productive and extractive pillars of state capacity are 
also understudied, although there is some limited evidence of a beneficial effect of peace 
missions on agricultural economic productivity in South Sudan.12 To our knowledge, 
meanwhile, there has been no systematic research on how peace missions affect a state’s 
diplomatic capacity. Most importantly, a systematic and comparative study of the effects of 
UN missions — after those missions have closed and peacekeepers have withdrawn — is 
missing across all of these dimensions of state capacity. 
                                                          
7 Diehl and Druckman, “Evaluating Peace Operations”. 
8 Joshi, “United Nations Peacekeeping, Democratic Process, and the Durability of Peace after Civil Wars”. 
9 Steinert and Grimm, “Too Good to Be True ?” 
10 Ruggeri, Dorussen and Gizelis, “Winning the Peace Locally”; Hultman, Kathman and Shannon, “United 
Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War”; Hultman, Kathman and Shannon, “Beyond Keeping 
Peace.” 
11 Karim, “Restoring Confidence in Post-Conflict Security Sectors.” 
12 Caruso et al., “The Economic Impact of Peacekeeping. Evidence from South Sudan.” Also, Beber et al.’s 
working paper suggests that the arrival of peacekeepers fuels the local economy and generates high demand for 
low-skilled workers that will likely require “painful adjustment” after withdrawal (see Beber et al., “Challenges 
and Pitfalls of Peacekeeping Economies”).  
This brief article first presents descriptive statistics on how host states perform on 
different dimensions of state capacity after UN blue helmets leave. Based on proxies suggested 
by the existing literature13 and current mandates,  we focus on GDP growth, level of democracy, 
state authority, and women’s conditions. While these measures do not map neatly onto the four 
dimensions of state capacity, they are still relevant for peacebuilding and proxy at least three 
of the dimensions. Polity score, for example, can measure the quality of institutions, while GDP 
growth and infant mortality rates (IMR) proxy potential productive capacity, and territorial 
control and rule of law capture state capacity in the security dimension. Trends of across all of 
these dimensions have been studied during peace missions, but not across the transition from 
deployment to withdrawal. This article moves from these descriptive trends to highlight 
significant methodological challenges encountered when studying peacekeeping legacies. 
 
Descriptive Trends: Before, During and After UN Mission Presence  
In this section, we provide graphs that reflect trends before during and after UN peace missions 
on four variables, namely GDP growth, level of democracy, the extent of state authority and 
women’s conditions proxied by infant mortality rates and empowerment.14 We focus on these 
variables not only because they map onto key dimensions of state capacity, but also because 
peacebuilding activities of contemporary missions are often expected to impact these 
measurements. Economic and political development, support for restoration of state authority 
and cross-cutting gender tasks complement most missions’ core security tasks.15  
Our sample includes countries that have experienced a civil war (as defined by 
UCDP/PRIO), received a UN deployment, and then seen the UN withdraw. Our time frame 
comprises 10 years during the mission and 10 years after withdrawal (t=0).16 In the graphs, we 
chart one standard deviation above and below the mean with dotted lines, to show the level of 
variation within a certain period among different cases. The red line indicates average pre-
deployment levels for that variable.17 We use the term “descriptive trends” because we do not 
provide inferential statistics and we do not claim any causal effects; however, these descriptive 
                                                          
13 Hendrix, cited in Ibid. 
14 IMRs are commonly used as indirect measure of women’s access to health. As noted above, IMRs also have 
implications for future economic growth.  
15 See Lanholtz, 2010, United Nations, “Principles and Guidelines for UN Peacekeeping Operations”, Chapter 2. 
16 Average mission duration in our sample (1990-2015) is 11.3 years. When a mission replaces an existing one in 
the same country, we do not consider this as an after-mission case. Notice that we also collapse multiple missions 
in the same country (e.g. UNAMID and UNMIS in Sudan). 
17 We use pre-deployment level as reference because we want to compare during-mission with after-mission 
periods to observe whether positive changes linked to mission’s presence reverse when host countries are left 
alone. 
analyses visualise temporal trends of core variables that could provide some starting insights 
into the relationship between the outcomes observed and UN PKO withdrawals. To be more 
explicit, we avoid using regression tables for two reasons. First, this piece seeks to offer an 
introductory empirical context for studying the effects of UN missions’ withdrawals and, 
second, regressions track the correlational nature between observables and we do not want to 
suggest any causal effects given the paucity of data, the research design challenges, and the 
limited space of this piece. All variables are from the V-Dem data project.18 
 
GDP Growth:  The literature on armed conflict has highlighted that civil wars have a 
significantly negative effect on a state’s GDP and economic development.19 Figure 1 shows a 
feature that is common to all of the graphs that follow. The dashed lines plot the standard 
deviation from the mean (solid line), describing variation in the sample. The red line indicates 
the average pre-deployment level of GDP growth. We can see that at some point in time, 
especially during the first year of UN deployment, the deviation from the mean is too large to 
be indicative. It seems, however, that countries have a more similar trajectory after UN 
withdrawal (shown by the smaller standard deviation), and most (but not all) countries 
experience growth in GDP, after exit. Notice the scale, which suggests that GDP changes have 
a very broad range. 
Figure 1. GDP growth during and after UN missions 
 
                                                          
18 Coppedge et al.,  “V-Dem Dataset v7”. 
19 Bove, Elia and Smith, “On the Heterogeneous Consequences of Civil War”; Costalli, Moretti and Pischedda, 
“The Economic Costs of Civil War”. 
 
 
Democracy: For countries that suffer civil war and then host a UN peacekeeping operation, 
which subsequently withdraws, we chart an apparent positive change in both Polity (left) and 
Polyarchy scores (right), after exit. However, dashed boundaries in Figure 2 suggest significant 
levels of uncertainty surrounding that observation, and so even though we can see positive 
trends, it means that there has been such large-scale variation among cases that it is not possible 
to assert with confidence that there is a positive trend.  
 




State Authority: The data in Figure 3 show that both UN deployment, and subsequent 
withdrawal, are associated with an improvement in state territorial control (left) and rule of law 
(right) in recipient countries. The short-lived decline corresponding to mission’s withdrawal 
on both measures of state control and authority may be attributed to an adjustment for complete 
hand over of responsibility from the UN, suggesting potential unintended effects of missions’ 
withdrawal that would bear attention. Interestingly, the “after exit” period has a significant 
increase of territorial control by the central authority (left figure). Again, uncertainty around 
the observed trend begs caution.   
 




Women’s Conditions: Figure 4 suggests that the level of infant mortality decreases after PKO 
withdrawal. However, two possible issues emerge. First, variation of these declines is 
substantial. Second, this data may also capture the system-level effect of declining infant 
mortality rates across the developing world since World War II. We also note that another 
measure of women’s conditions, namely women empowerment, steadily improves both during 
and after the mission. 
 
Taken together and with a grain of salt given the large uncertainty boundaries, these 
trends describe a seemingly positive trajectory for countries after PKO exit. Some positive 
trends, such a decline in IMR and institutional improvements seem to persist, though trends in 
economic recovery measured by GDP growth are less clear-cut. 




In light of the trends presented above, it is vital to highlight three important challenges for 
future research that aims to investigate effects of the withdrawal of UN peace operations on 
state capacity: missing data, small samples, and non-random assignment of the treatment.  
A key challenge researchers will encounter is the small population of cases, as our 
sample includes a maximum of 20 UN missions. Given the aim of investigating after-exit 
trends, the sample is necessarily limited to missions that are concluded. Also, data is not always 
available for all cases, which further limits the available sample and potentially signals an issue 
of non-random missing data. This challenge is significant as, even if we were able to include 
the entire universe of completed UN missions, the sample would only number 57: excluding 
Cold War-era missions—the first generation of peacekeeping operations—the number of cases 
drops to 44 missions globally. Among these 44 missions, we may decide to focus only on those 
whose mandates included capacity building, and whose presence extended beyond phases of 
intense violence. Samples (N) shrink further when accounting for additional treatments across 
time.  The largest sample is N1, where all units could experience a civil war (first treatment). 
Then, within the smaller N2 of civil war countries only, some of these could receive a UN 
deployment (second treatment). This leads to an even smaller N3 of countries with UN peace 
operations. Finally, only some countries have experienced the withdrawal of UN missions 
(third treatment), making up a sample of N4; and if we are to study countries over 5 years after 
withdrawal, this would leave us with the smallest sample (N5). 
Furthermore, available cases of completed missions exhibit one crucial problem. Not 
only do countries receive multiple treatments over time, but these treatments are also 
systematically related and unlikely to be random. Effective research design to evaluate the 
effects of UN withdrawal would need to account for the multiple treatments and their likely 
non-random assignment based on observable data-generating processes or, even harder, on 
unobservable ones. These research designs must also assess the different intensities and timings 
of each treatment. 
 
Final Remarks 
Should empirical and methodological limitations prevent the academic community from 
investigating the effects of UN peace missions on state capacity after exit? We believe not. 
Even in the absence of clear-cut identification strategies for gauging the effect of UN 
withdrawals, the lasting consequences of these missions on state stability – after the UN has 
left — are vital to understand. However, this means that scholars should invest heavily in 
methodological triangulation (qualitative/quantitative and different level of analysis) and 
transparency of inferential scope conditions. As we highlighted above, when using aggregate-
level data (country-year) analysis, these preliminary trends show a high level of heterogeneity 
between cases. Thus, beside useful and necessary qualitative analysis based on fieldwork, 
quantitative analyses based on observational data with subnational variation20  and surveys after 
UN exit21 will serve as fruitful models to gauge the effects of UN withdrawal on state capacity.  
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